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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
  
The District Court Erred In Denying The State’s Motion For Summary Dismissal 
And In Granting Ho Any Relief On His Untimely, Unverified Petition 
 
A. Introduction 
 In 2004, Ho pled guilty to distribution of marijuana and, in 2013, in a 
separate criminal case that was filed in 2012, Ho pled guilty to unlawful 
possession of a firearm.  (See R., p.4; Exhibits 1, 3.)   In 2016, Ho filed a single 
untimely, unverified post-conviction petition requesting relief in relation to both 
his 2004 and 2012 cases.  (R., pp.4-8.)  The same day Ho filed his petition, Ho 
also filed a Motion for Expedited Hearing.  (R., pp.11-12.)  The district court 
granted Ho’s request for an expedited hearing and ultimately denied the state’s 
motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.47-58), and entered a “Judgment” granting 
the following relief:   
1)  Mr. Ho’s plea of guilty entered on February 11, 2013 to the 
charge of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 18-3316 in Blaine County case no. CR-2012-2219 is 
hereby SET ASIDE AND WITHDRAWN. 
 
2)  Mr. Ho’s conviction and sentence in Blaine County Case no. 
CR-2012-2219, entered and filed on the 16th day of April, 2013, is 
hereby VACATED. 
 
(R., p.60 (capitalization original)).     
The state appealed, asserting the district court erred in considering the 
merits of any of the claims raised in Ho’s untimely, unverified petition, and erred 
in granting Ho any relief.  (See generally Appellant’s brief.)   
 In response, Ho contends (1) “the State’s motion to summarily dismiss 
[his] post-conviction petition should never have been heard to begin with” 
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because it was “time barred pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906”; (2) he was not required 
to verify his petition because “the entire historical proceeding of the case was a 
matter of record”; (3) claims raised pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(a)(1)-(5) “are not 
subject to any time bar”; (4) a joint petition was proper because the cases are 
“inseparably connected, and relief could not have been granted in one case 
without looking at the other”; (5) he is entitled to relief in relation to his 2004 case 
regardless of whether he had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel on a post-
judgment motion; and (6) he was entitled to relief because counsel’s advice 
regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea was deficient and it 
was “unnecessary” for him to present evidence of prejudice.  (Respondent’s 
brief, pp.14-35.)  All of Ho’s arguments lack merit.      
 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Considering The 
State’s Motion For Summary Dismissal 
 
 Ho filed his post-conviction petition and a Motion for Expedited Hearing on 
June 20, 2016.  (R., pp.4-8, 11-12.)  On that same day, the district court entered 
an order granting an “expedited hearing,” finding “good cause” to “shorten[ ]” “the 
statutory fourteen (14) day notice requirement for Motions” and scheduled a 
hearing on Ho’s petition for June 23, 2016.  (R., p.9.)  At the June 23 hearing, 
the court advised the state it was not giving it “time to file for a summary 
[dismissal],” but stated it would give the state “30 days to answer,” even though 
the court did not think it was “going to matter much here.”  (Tr., p.21, Ls.19-22, 
p.22, Ls.16-18.)  Following the June 23, 2016 hearing, the court entered a 
“scheduling order” requiring the parties to “complete discovery by 5:00 p.m. on 
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July 21, 2016,” and setting “the final hearing in this matter” for July 28, 2016.  
(R., p.15.)   
 On July 26, 2016, the state filed its Answer, an Objection to Unverified 
Petition for Post Conviction and Commingling Separate Criminal Cases Into a 
Single Petition for PostConviction (“Objection”), and a Motion for Summary 
Dismissal (“Motion”).  (R., pp.26-35.)  The state also filed a motion to shorten 
time to have its motion for summary dismissal and objection considered at the 
scheduled July 28 hearing.  (R., p.37; see also p.39.)   
 The same day the state filed its Answer and Motion, Ho filed an Objection 
and Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss the State’s Answer, Motion for Summary 
Dismissal, and Motion to Shorten Time, contending the state’s answer was “time 
bared” [sic], and complaining that the state filed its Motion “not even two days 
before the final hearing.”  (R., p.42.)  Ho asked the court to either dismiss or 
strike the state’s Answer and Motion.  (R., pp.41-43.)   
 At the July 28 hearing, the state explained that the deadline for filing was 
“mis-calendared for the 26th,” which was the reason it was “late.”  (Tr., p.30, 
Ls.20-24.)  Ho again objected to “everything the State has filed” based on 
timeliness.  (Tr., p.81, Ls.16-21.)  The court overruled Ho’s objections.  (Tr., p.81, 
Ls.22-24.)   
 On appeal, Ho contends the state’s Motion “should never have been 
heard to begin with” because it was not filed within “30 days after docketing the 
application,” as required by I.C. § 19-4906.  (Respondent’s brief, p.15.)  Ho has 
failed to show error in the district court’s consideration of the defenses set forth 
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in the state’s Answer, Motion, or Objection.  Idaho Code Section 19-4906(a) 
provides, in relevant part:  “Within 30 days after the docketing of the application, 
or within any further time the court may fix, the state shall respond by answer or 
by motion which may be supported by affidavits.”  Thus, under the plain 
language of the statute, a district court has discretion to modify the 30-day 
response time.  Ho has offered no argument or authority to support his claim that 
the district court erred in doing so in this case.  Instead, Ho only notes that the 
documents were untimely and claims he was “severely prejudic[ed]” as a result, 
but he never explains how he was allegedly prejudiced.  (Respondent’s brief, 
p.15.)  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what prejudice Ho suffered given the 
court’s decision to grant him relief.   
 Because Ho has failed to present any argument or cite any authority 
supporting his assertion that the district court “should never have” considered the 
state’s defenses to Ho’s petition, Ho’s timeliness claim is waived.1  State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“A party waives an issue 
cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are 
lacking.”) 
 
                                            
1 Ho also contends:  “Counsel further argued that the State failed to comply with 
IRCP 12(c) and (I), the State failed to comply with the Court’s scheduling order 
outlined in IRCP 37(b)(2) and also failed to set their motion for hearing 14 days 
prior to the evidentiary hearing.  For any number of the reasons Stated [sic], the 
State’s answer should have been denied and stricken from the record, and the 
State’s motions to dismiss and shorten time should have also been denied.” 
(Respondent’s brief, p.15.)  These complaints are even less clear than Ho’s I.C. 
§ 19-4906 argument.  Other than noting that “[c]ounsel” made such arguments, 
Ho has failed to articulate how any ruling with respect to these arguments was 
error.  (Respondent’s brief, p.15.)         
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C. Ho’s Contention That Verification Is Not Required Is Contrary To The 
Plain Language Of I.C. §§ 19-4902(a) And 19-4903 
 
Idaho Code Section 19-4902(a) provides that a post-conviction 
“proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with 
the clerk of the district court in which the conviction took place.”    Idaho Code 
Section 19-4903 further provides:  “Facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant shall be set forth separately from other allegations of facts and shall be 
verified as provided in section 19-4902.”  Consistent with these requirements, the 
appellate courts in this state have held: 
An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in 
an ordinary civil action.  An application must contain much more 
than “a short and plain statement of the claim” that would suffice for 
a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).  Rather, an application for post-
conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the 
personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or 
other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the 
application must state why such supporting evidence is not 
included with the application.  I.C. § 19-4903.  In other words, the 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be 
subject to dismissal.       
 
Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 579, 181 P.3d 504, 505 (Ct. App. 2007).  
 
Ho’s petition was not verified.  (R., pp.4-6.)  Despite the verification 
requirement plainly stated in I.C. § 19-4902(a), the district court, relying on the 
Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Goodrich, 103 Idaho 430, 649 P.2d 389 
(Ct. App. 1982),  concluded “Ho did not need to verify his petition” because “the 
entire historical proceeding of this case is a matter of record.”  (R., p.54.)  As 
noted in the Appellant’s brief, the district court’s reliance on the Court of Appeals’ 
opinion in Goodrich was improper because that opinion was vacated once the 
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Idaho Supreme Court granted review.  See State v. Goodrich, 104 Idaho 469, 
660 P.2d 934 (1983).   
Ho argues that the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Goodrich still applies 
because, on review, the Supreme Court did not make any “findings overturning 
the trial Court or the Court of Appeals [sic] decisions regarding verification.”  
(Respondent’s brief, p.17.)  Ho’s argument misunderstands the nature of 
Supreme Court review.  The Idaho Supreme Court does not “overturn” the Court 
of Appeals.  Rather, on review, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the 
district court in light of the issues presented on review.  State v. Ostler, 161 
Idaho 350, 386 P.3d 491 (2016) (“On review of a case from the Court of 
Appeals, this Court gives due consideration to the Court of Appeals’ decision, but 
directly reviews the decision of the trial court.”) (quotations and citation omitted).  
On review in Goodrich, the Supreme Court only held that summary judgment in 
favor of the petitioner was improper because there were “[n]umerous factual 
disputes” requiring an evidentiary hearing.  State v. Goodrich, 104 Idaho 469, 
472, 660 P.2d 934, 937 (1983).  Even if the Court’s determination that an 
evidentiary hearing was required constitutes an implicit rejection of the state’s 
argument at the trial level that the lack of a verification deprived the court of 
jurisdiction, the state submits, as it did in its opening brief, that even if a verified 
petition is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, the failure to verify a petition or provide 
an affidavit of facts in support of the petition should preclude a finding that there 
is a genuine issue of material fact warranting an evidentiary hearing.   
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Ho appears to contend otherwise, arguing that “logic and common-sense 
dictates [sic] that if a petition for post-conviction [sic] is based entirely on the 
record of proceedings, and the affidavit of prior counsel; verification would not 
only be unnecessary, but would further the manifest injustice that the petition 
seeks to correct.”  (Respondent’s brief, p.17 (punctuation original).)  The 
“manifest injustice” to which Ho refers appears to be that if verification or an 
affidavit is required, he will have “to sit in jail for additional time, and pay 
thousands of dollars to obtain a verification of something that [he] does not 
understand or could possibly add anything to, which further punishes [him].”  
(Respondent’s brief, pp.17-18.)  This argument ignores the procedural and 
substantive law that applies to Ho’s petition and the claims he raised therein.   
Procedurally, the law required Ho to file a timely verified petition.  Idaho 
Code Section 19-4902(a) states:  “Facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant and the authenticity of all documents and exhibits included in or 
attached to the application must be sworn to affirmatively as true and correct.”  
(Emphasis added.)  It is unclear why this requirement would compel Ho to “sit in 
jail for additional time” or “pay thousands of dollars.”  It is equally unclear why 
verification compels “something that [he] does not understand.”  It was Ho who 
pled guilty to the crimes at issue, and it is Ho who knows the reasons he did so.   
Substantively, in order to succeed on any claim that his guilty plea was the 
result of erroneous advice from counsel, Ho must present evidence that his guilty 
plea was the product of that advice.  See Icanovic v. State, 159 Idaho 524, 529-
530, 363 P.3d 365, 370-371 (2015).  Since Ho did not verify his petition or 
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submit an affidavit, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and because 
he did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, he failed to meet his burden and was 
not entitled to any relief.   
 
D. Ho’s Assertion That There Is No Statute Of Limitation Applicable To His 
Post-Conviction Claims Is Contrary To Law              
 
 Ho’s 2016 post-conviction petition was not timely from Ho’s 2004 
judgment of conviction, from the court’s orders on any of the post-judgment 
motions Ho filed in his 2004 case, or from the judgment entered in Ho’s 2012 
case.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.18-21.)  Ho claims otherwise, arguing his 
petition is timely because it “falls squarely within I.C. section 19-4901(a)(4)” and 
“Section(a)(1-5) [sic] are not subject to any time bar.”  (Respondent’s brief, 
pp.23-25.)  These arguments are contrary to law.  
 Idaho Code Section 19-4901(a) sets forth the grounds upon which a 
petitioner may pursue post-conviction relief.  The ground articulated in 
subsection (a)(4) reads:  “That there exists evidence of material facts, not 
previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or 
sentence in the interest of justice.”  Ho’s claims that counsel was ineffective are 
based on the Sixth Amendment and fall within the purview of subsection (a)(1), 
which authorizes relief when “the conviction or the sentence was in violation of 
the constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state.”  I.C. 
§ 19-4901(a)(1).  Regardless, whether within the purview of subsection (a)(1) or 
(a)(4), Ho’s claims are subject to the one-year post-conviction statute of 
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limitation.  Ho’s argument to the contrary is based on his interpretation of I.C. § 
19-4901(b), which is irrelevant to the statute of limitation.     
 Idaho Code Section 19-4901(b) provides that any claim “which could have 
been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered 
in post-conviction proceedings, unless . . . the asserted basis for relief raises a 
substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the 
exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier.”  By its plain language, 
Section 19-4901(b) addresses the general bar to raising claims in post-conviction 
that could have been raised on direct appeal; it does not govern the statute of 
limitation.  Idaho Code Section 19-4902(b) governs the statute of limitation and 
requires a petition to “be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of a proceeding following appeal, whichever is later.”  Nothing in 
this section modifies the statute of limitation based upon the nature of the claim 
as described by Section 19-4901(a).  Ho’s argument that claims based on Idaho 
Code “Section [19-4901](a)(1-5) are not subject to any time bar” is contrary to 
law and without merit.   
 
E. A Single Post-Conviction Petition For Two Underlying Criminal Cases Is 
Improper    
  
 In response to the state’s assertion that it is improper to file a single 
petition relating to two underlying criminal cases, Ho contends that doing so was 
proper because his “case is unique in that you could not make a finding by 
looking at any one case by itself.”  (Respondent’s brief, p.25.)  Ho’s argument 
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misunderstands the state’s position.  The state’s position is not that a court 
cannot “look” at another case; the state’s position is that separate petitions must 
be filed pursuant to the language of the statute and because each petition is 
governed by a separate statute of limitation.  Filing separate petitions does not 
foreclose the court, in ruling on the individual petitions, from “look[ing]” at all 
relevant evidence, which may include evidence as to what occurred in a prior 
case.   
 Ho also asserts that because “the Idaho State legislature gave the Courts 
power to correct a ‘manifest injustice’ as outlined in I.C.R. 33, and also vacate a 
sentence ‘in the interest of justice’ as noted in 19-4901(4),” the law cannot 
prevent the court from reaching the result it reached in this case.  (Respondent’s 
brief, pp.25-26 (verbatim).)  This argument lacks merit for at least two reasons.  
First, I.C.R. 33 has no bearing on this case.  Although the district court purported 
to “set aside” and “withdraw” Ho’s guilty plea in the 2012 case, it did not do so 
pursuant to I.C.R. 33, nor could it because any request pursuant to I.C.R. 33 
would be untimely.  State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 79 P.3d 711 (2003) (holding 
that a district court lacks jurisdiction to consider an I.C.R. 33 motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea filed after judgment becomes final). 
 Second, the “interest of justice” language set forth in I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) 
does not exist in a vacuum.  Beyond the fact that Ho’s claims are not based on 
subsection (a)(4), the procedural requirements of the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act (“UPCPA”), including the statute of limitation, govern resolution of 
post-conviction claims.  Ho is not entitled to relief just because he (or the district 
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court) believe “justice” so requires.  Although Ho thinks the state is “attempting to 
skirt the real issue,” which he claims is “the fact that an immigrant to the United 
States, who came here as a refugee, was failed by the system” (Respondent’s 
brief, pp.35-36), the reality is that Ho originally entered “the system” by 
distributing a controlled substance, and the “real issue” is whether the district 
court’s resolution of Ho’s petition comported with the law; it did not.     
 
F. Ho’s Claim That The Sixth Amendment Is Irrelevant To His Post-
Conviction Claims Is Contrary To Law     
 
 Ho’s claim that counsel was ineffective in pursuing his I.C. § 19-2604 
motion to set aside the judgment fails because he had no Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel with respect to that motion.  See State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454, 
458, 235 P.3d 404, 408 (Ct. App. 2010) (Because “a post-judgment hearing 
upon a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a critical stage for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment,” “Hartshorn has failed to show that he was deprived of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the post-judgment hearing on his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.”).  Ho apparently agrees, arguing “[t]his case is not 
about whether a defendant had a 6th amendment right to counsel.”  
(Respondent’s brief, p.27.)  Rather, Ho contends, this case is about negligence.  
(Respondent’s brief, p.27.)  The UPCPA does not, however, authorize 
negligence actions.  See I.C. § 19-4901(a).  Ho asks, “What other standard 
would the State have the Court use[?]”  (Respondent’s brief, p.28.)  The answer 
to that question is the standard governing Sixth Amendment claims, which is the 
only type of challenge to attorney performance authorized by the UPCPA.  If Ho 
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wishes to sue his attorney based on negligence, he must choose a different 
procedural vehicle.   
 
G. The District Court Erred In Granting Ho Relief On His Claim That Counsel 
Was Ineffective In Failing To Inform Ho Of The Consequences Of 
Pleading Guilty To Unlawful Possession Of A Firearm 
 
 In response to the state’s assertion that the district court erred in granting 
him relief on his claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to inform him of the 
consequences of pleading guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.24-30), Ho contends, in part,2 that “[p]resentation of evidence of 
whether he would have pled guilty or not is unnecessary, because he should 
have never been put in that position to begin with.”  (Respondent’s brief, pp.34-
35.)  This argument is contrary to law.  
 A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
show both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice from 
that deficiency; failing to prove either prong individually or both will 
defeat a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  To establish 
prejudice resulting from his or her attorney’s performance, a 
defendant must show that as a result of counsel’s deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial.  Such a defendant must convince the court that a 
decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under 
the circumstances.   
 
Icanovic, 159 Idaho at 529, 363 P.3d at 370 (quotations, citations, and brackets 
omitted).  See also Lee v. United States, 2017 WL 2694701 *6, --- S.Ct. --- 
(2017) (quotations and citation omitted) (“when a defendant claims that his 
counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept 
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a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial”). 
 Ho was required to properly allege and prove prejudice.  He did not.  As a 
result, he was not entitled to relief.      
 
CONCLUSION 
  
 The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court’s 
Findings and Conclusions on Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and its 
Judgment granting Ho post-conviction relief. 
 DATED this 11th day of July, 2017. 
       
   /s/  Jessica M. Lorello   
 JESSICA M. LORELLO 
 Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
2 The state declines to address Ho’s other arguments regarding the merits of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims because the merits of those claims are 
covered in the state’s opening brief.   
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